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DOES CONFUSION REIGN AT THE INTERSECTION 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?: 
REVIEW OF INTERPRETIVE RULES AND POLICY 
STATEMENTS UNDER JUDICIAL REVIEW 
PROVISIONS SUCH AS RCRA SECTION 7006(a)(l) 
1bm J. Boer* 
Many environmental statutes, including the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), have specific judicial review provisions provid-
ing for review of agency actions in the D.C. Circuit. Confusion has 
mounted, however, as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
industry, and environmental interest groups have tried to interpret the 
exact circumstances under which review is available pursuant to these 
provisions. This confusion stems in part from the wide array of agency 
pronouncements, including interpretive rules, policy manuals, and guid-
ance documents, which fall within the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) definition of a "rule." The article analyzes the D.C. Circuit's 
review of interpretive rules and policy statements, and attempts to 
discern a pattern that would provide guidance to interested parties 
seeking to comply with statutory review provisions like that in RCRA. 
The author calls on the D.C. Circuit to clarify the confusion surrounding 
its interpretation of judicial review provisions in environmental stat-
utes. 
INTRODUCTION 
The judicial review provision of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), section 7006(a)(1), states that: 
* Attorney, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of General Counsel; J.D. 1998, The 
George Washington University Law School; A.B. 1995, Occidental College. The views and 
analysis expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the official policy or 
legal position of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or the United States Government. 
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a petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgat-
ing any regulation, or requirement under this chapter or denying 
any petition for the promulgation, amendment or repeal of any 
regulation under this chapter may be filed only in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and such 
petition shall be filed within ninety days from the date of such 
promulgation or denial, or after such date if such petition for 
review is based solely on grounds arising after such ninetieth day 
1 
N either Congress, through RCRA or other comparable environment-
al statutes, nor the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have 
adequately defined what actions of the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency) are included in the term "any 
regulation[] or requirement."2 Without guidance, it remains unclear 
whether review of all regulations or rules issued or promulgated 
under the Administrative Procedure Acta (APA) must be challenged 
in the D.C. Circuit within the statutorily allotted time period, or 
whether RCRA section 7006(a)(1) applies only to a specific and limited 
set of agency actions. 
The uncertainty in this area originates with the APA's broad defini-
tion of a "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general 
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, 
procedure or practice requirements of an agency .... "4 According to 
Robert A. Anthony: 
[Agency action] encompassed by this definition come[s] in a myr-
iad of forms and bears endless labels: legislative rules, interpre-
tive rules, opinion letters, policy statements, policies, program 
letters, Dear Colleague letters, regulatory guidance letters, rule 
interpretations, guidances, guidelines, staff instructions, manuals, 
questions and answers, bulletins, advisory circulars, models, en-
forcement policies, action levels, press releases, [and Congres-
sional] testimony.5 
1 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1994), 
is not the only envirOlimental statute with this type of review provision. Cf Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) 
(1994); Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994). The analysis 
contained herein is equally applicable to these statutory provisions. 
242 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1). 
35 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994). 
4 Id. § 551(4). 
5 Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.1311, 1320 (1992); 
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The confusion that surrounds the RCRA judicial review provision 
is detrimental to the government, industry, and environmental 
groups. EPA is affected because the Agency may often prefer a 
definite and quick judicial resolution where conflict over a regulation 
is expected.6 If a rule or regulation is to be invalidated by the courts, 
EPA may elect to address the rule's infirmities and quickly formulate 
a new approach. At the same time, however, the Agency may make 
statements or pronouncements that it intends not to be subject to 
review under section 7006(a)(1), and only be reviewable in court when 
applied to a particular, specific set of circumstances. A clear judicial 
articulation defining those administrative actions that are subject to 
section 7006(a)(1) review would allow EPA to tailor its administrative 
actions by taking into account whether the Agency's decisions would 
be subject to immediate judicial review. 
Industry is often concerned about judicial review provisions be-
cause it does not want to fail to file suit challenging a rule within the 
statutory time period.7 Generally, if industry disagrees with an agency 
action, it would prefer to challenge the action under the equivalent to 
RCRA's section 7006(a)(1) provision because standing and ripeness 
are not as likely to be significant bars to litigation.8 At the same time, 
however, industry does not want to spend the time or the money 
necessary to file a suit if there is a significant likelihood that it will be 
see also National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 701 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
6 Cf WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING POLITICS & PROCESSES 50 (1985). 
For instance, in choosing between rulemaking and adjudication, agencies often choose rulemak-
ing because they are interested in formulating and enforcing policies quickly and with a mini-
mum expenditure of resources. See id. 
7 See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("As a general proposition, 
however, if there is any doubt about the ripeness of a claim, petitioners must bring their 
challenge in a timely fashion or risk being barred."); see generally Horsehead Resource Dev. 
Co. v. EPA, 130 F.3d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing RCRA § 7006 "window" for filing chal-
lenges to agency actions). 
8 If a challenge under section 7006(a)(1) of RCRA is not possible, it may be necessary for a 
company to violate the agency's rule, regulation, or pronouncement to gain the necessary 
standing and establish ripeness in order to bring a challenge in court. This is not a preferred 
method of challenging an agency action because if the company loses, it may be forced to pay 
civil or criminal penalties for the violation which gave rise to standing and ripeness. Further-
more, if the rule is challenged in another circuit and the industry wins, that decision will only 
apply within that particular circuit-whereas a ruling by the D.C. Circuit would force the 
agency to reconsider nationwide application of the rule. This is a particularly important issue 
for large companies that operate within a geographic area encompassing numerous federal 
circuits. 
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dismissed as outside of the scope of judicial review provisions similar 
to RCRA section 7006(a)(1). 
Although their motives for challenging an agency action may differ 
significantly, environmental organizations have many of the same un-
derlying issues as industry. Environmental groups are concerned 
about the possibility that a failure to promptly challenge a rule due to 
confusion over the application of judicial review provisions of RCRA 
or other statutes may result in missing the statutory deadline for 
filing a challenge.9 These organizations are, in many cases, restricted 
by standing considerations to challenging rules through a judicial 
review process like RCRA section 7006(a)(1).10 These challenges, how-
ever, may also be a preferred approach to directly confronting EPA 
actions because a victory in the D.C. Circuit forces EPA to completely 
withdraw the rule, whereas a victory in another circuit would have 
only limited, rather than a nationwide, application.ll 
This article seeks to find a pattern in the D.C. Circuit's review of 
interpretive rules and policy statements pursuant to the judicial re-
view provisions similar to RCRA section 7006(a)(1). After a brief re-
view of administrative rulemaking, this article: (1) addresses whether 
a freestanding interpretive rule would be reviewable in the D.C. 
Circuit under RCRA section 7006(a)(1); (2) discusses the factors the 
D.C. Circuit would consider in deciding whether to deny review on 
ripeness grounds; (3) considers whether review by the D.C. Circuit 
precludes future review of an interpretive rule in other circuits aris-
ing from the application of the rule in an enforcement case; and 
(4) calls for the D.C. Circuit to address these issues and thereby 
provide EPA and stakeholders the necessary insight into jurisdic-
tional and ripeness issues when review of an agency action is sought. 
9 See generally supra note 7. 
10 See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Sam Kalen, Standing On 
Its Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental Cases, 
13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 1 (1997). 
11 See 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 604 (1994) ("Although in theory federal law is unitary, 
conflicts inevitably develop among the circuits as to their interpretations of federal law. Absent 
some direction from the United States Supreme Court, binding precedent for the District 
Courts within a circuit is set by the Court of Appeals for that circuit. A case decided by the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit does not control the outcome of a dispute in the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.") (citations omitted). 
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1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: SORTING OUT 
LEGISLATIVE RULES, INTERPRETATIVE RULES, AND GENERAL 
STATEMENTS OF POLICY 
A. A Primer on Administrative Law 
When an administrative agency, such as EPA, decides to make 
a pronouncement to the public, a myriad of potential avenues are 
available.12 Under the APA, however, only three general methods of 
binding administrative rulemaking are specifically contemplated: 
(1) formal rulemaking with many of the procedures typical of an ad-
judicatory hearing;13 (2) informal rulemaking requiring only the mini-
mal requirements of notice and comment;14 and (3) agency policy rule-
making which emerges from agency precedential adjudications.15 
EPA, like many federal agencies, almost invariably uses the informal 
rulemaking process when choosing among these three options. This 
article, therefore, is concerned only with the informal, substantive 
rulemaking process-particularly the differences between legislative 
rules promulgated under the informal rulemaking requirements of the 
APA and interpretive rules and general statements of policy which 
are exempted from the informal rulemaking notice and comment re-
quirements.16 
The Attorney General's Manual on the APA defines legislative 
rules, interpretive rules, and general statements of policy as follows: 
12 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
13 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1994). In a 1973 decision, the United States Supreme Court 
interpreted the APA to require formal rulemaking only in the relatively rare circumstances 
where the agency's organic statute used the phrase "on the record after hearing," or nearly 
identical language. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973). In all 
other situations, including the usual case in which the statute reads "after hearing," an agency 
may use informal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. See id. The flexibility afforded 
to agencies in choosing a rulemaking procedure after Florida East Coast, coupled with the 
increasing complexity of formal rulemakings, led many agencies to abandon the more formal 
procedure altogether. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE 
TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULE MAKING 4-5 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ACWAj (noting that formal 
rulemaking is used infrequently). An example of the increasing complexity of formal rulemaking 
can be seen vividly in the Food and Drug Administration's proposed rule on the issue of whether 
a product labeled "peanut butter" must contain 87% or 90% peanuts. The formal rulemaking 
addressing this question took nine years and produced a transcript of 7736 pages. See 1 KEN-
NETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8 (2d ed. 1978). 
14 See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
15 See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
16 See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
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Substantive [legislative] rules-rules, other than organization 
or procedural . . . issued by an agency pursuant to statutory 
authority and which implement the statute .... Sllch rules have 
the force and effect of law. 
Interpretative [interpretive] rules-rules or statements issued 
by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of 
the statutes and rules which it administers. [citations omitted] 
General Statements of Policy-statements issued by an agency 
to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the 
agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.17 
Despite these seemingly straightforward definitions, numerous deci-
sions in the D.C. Circuit have expressed that the distinction between 
these three forms of agency action is anything but clear-cut in prac-
tice. Is Part of this confusion may have arisen because "it often serves 
the interests of both agencies and the courts to blur or manipulate the 
distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules."19 This leads 
to different arguments in court by litigants, and different bases for 
decisions by the D.C. Circuit in challenges to disputed rules, depend-
ing upon the specific factual circumstances surrounding the challenge 
and the rule and the specific goals of the parties.20 Despite the confu-
17 A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA at 30 n.3 (1947) quoted in American Min. 
Congress v. MSHA, 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
18 See, e.g., Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (''We have long 
recognized that it is quite difficult to distinguish between substantive and interpretive rules .... 
Further confusing the matter is the tendency of courts and litigants to lump interpretative rules 
and policy statements together in contrast to substantive rules .... "); Community Nutrition 
Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The distinction between legislative rules and 
interpretative rules or policy statements has been described at various times as tenuous ... 
fuzzy ... blurred ... [and] enshrouded in considerable smog."); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 
834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing that the task of distinguishing between interpre-
tive and legislative rules is an "extraordinarily case-specific endeavor" and that "analogizing to 
prior cases is often of limited utility in light of the exceptional degree to which decisions in this 
doctrinal area turn on their precise facts."); cf. Justice Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 511 ("Administrative law is not for 
sissies-so you should lean back, clutch the side of your chairs, and steel yourselves .... "). 
19 Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatary Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 
384 (1985). ''The relevant distinction between legislative and interpretative or any other non-
legislative rules is not the nature of the questions they address but the authority and intent 
with which they are issued and the resulting effect on the power of a court to depart from the 
decision embodied in the rule." Joseph v. United States Civil Servo Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 
n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). 
20 Cf. KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 6.2 
(3d ed. 1994) ("Sometimes ambiguities in agency statements are created intentionally for stra-
tegic purposes. An agency may want to issue a statement that has binding effect without 
following the notice and comment procedures mandated for legislative rulemaking and without 
subjecting its statement to the kind of 'searching and careful' judicial review courts typically 
apply to legislative rules. Th further these illegitimate strategic .goals, an agency might inten-
tionally use ambiguous or inconsistent language in the hope that its regulatees will give its 
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sion, it is possible to extract from the numerous decisions concerning 
informal rulemaking the general legal principles delineating the com-
mon distinctions between legislative rules, interpretive rules, and 
general statements of policy. 
B. Legislative Rules 
A legislative rule21 is "essentially an administrative statute-an 
exercise of previously delegated power, new law that completes an 
incomplete legislative design."22 Legally binding upon the courts, the 
agency, and the public, these rules have the force of law.23 In promul-
gating a legislative rule, agencies must abide by the notice and com-
ment requirements of the APA.24 Furthermore, an agency must pos-
sess both the delegated authority to make rules with the force of law25 
and, more specifically, the delegated authority to act with respect to 
the subject matter of the proposed legislative rule.26 
C. Interpretive Rules 
In issuing an interpretive rule "an agency can declare its under-
standing of what a statute requires without providing notice and 
statement binding effect while the courts will characterize the statement as an unreviewable 
general statement of policy exempt from notice and comment procedures."). 
21 It has been argued that courts often confuse the term "substantive rule" to mean "legisla-
tive rule." See Anthony, supra note 5, at 1321 n.37. A preferable usage, it is argued, is to contrast 
the term "substantive rule" with a "procedural rule." See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1994). As such, 
the correct usage of the term "'substantive rule' ... embraces legislative rules, interpretive 
rules, and policy statements other than those concerned with procedure, practice, or agency 
organization." Anthony, supra note 5, n.37; see also Joseph, 554 F.2d at 1153 n.24 ("Interpreta-
tive rules may be substantive in the sense of addressing a substantive rather than a procedural 
issue of law .... "). But see Syncor, 127 F.3d at 93 (''We have long recognized that it is quite 
difficult to distinguish between substantive and interpretative rules."); American Hosp. Ass'n, 
834 F.2d at 1045 ("the spectrum between a clearly interpretive rule and a clearly substantive 
one is a hazy continuum"). 
22 Asimow, supra note 19, at 383. 
23 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
24 The APA's section 553 requirements call for (1) publication of the notice of proposed rule-
making (including notice of any public proceedings and the terms of the proposal or subjects 
involved); (2) opportunity for all interested persons to comment through the submission of 
written views (with or without the opportunity for oral presentation); (3) agency consideration 
of the matter presented; and (4) publication of the rule in the Federal Register, including a 
statement of the rule's basis and purpose. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1); see also Anthony, supra note 
5, at 1322 (describing requirements for legislative rule). An agency may also need to follow 
additional procedures demanded by its organic statute. Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 302-03, 315 (1979). 
25 See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302. 
26 See id. at 302-03. 
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comment, but an agency cannot go beyond the text of a statute . . . 
[and the interpretive rule] does not create any new right or duty but 
merely provides an interpretation of [the statute]."27 In American 
Mining Congress v.Mine Safety & Health Administration the court 
reconciled the case law distinguishing interpretive rules from legisla-
tive rules 
on the basis of whether the purported interpretive rule has "legal 
effect," which in turn is best ascertained by asking (1) whether in 
the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative 
basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer 
benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether the 
agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
(3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its generallegisla-
tive authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior 
legislative rule. If the answer to any of these questions is affirma-
tive, we have a legislative rule, not an interpretive rule.28 
Thus the principle distinction between interpretive rules and leg-
islative rules is that legislative rules have the force of law while 
interpretive rules do not.29 Because interpretive rules "merely clarify 
or explain existing law or regulations,"3o they may be issued by an 
agency without following the APA notice and comment procedures 
that are required for legislative rules.31 The APA does require, how-
ever, that interpretive rules of general applicability be published in 
the Federal Register.32 
The D.C. Circuit has noted that "Congress intended the exceptions 
to § 553's notice and comment requirements to be narrow ones."33 The 
purpose of interpretive rules, "[i]n light of the obvious importance of 
[§ 553's] goals of maximum participation and full information ... is to 
allow agencies to explain ambiguous terms in legislative enactments 
without having to undertake cumbersome proceedings."34 A concise 
27 Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
28 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But see infra note 48 (noting the APA requires 
publication of interpretive rules of general applicability in the Federal Register-thus step two 
of the American Mining Congress test merely restates that which is already required by the 
APA). 
29 See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
30 Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1983). 
31 See 5 U .S.C. § 553 (1994). 
32 See id. § 552(a)(1)(D). 
33 American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (1987) (explaining the purpose of notice 
and comment proceedings). 
34 [d. at 1044-45. 
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definition of an interpretive rule is: a nonbinding agency statement 
that has a tangible meaning, not issued by Congress, that interprets 
the language of a statute or a legislative rule.35 Courts do not treat 
interpretive rules as new law, on the premise that the rule must 
merely restate or explain the preexisting legislative acts and inten-
tions of Congress or an agency's own legislative rules.36 At least in 
theory, an interpretive rule is limited to "indicat[ing] an agency's 
reading of a statute or rule. It does not create new rights or duties, 
but only 'reminds' affected parties of existing duties."37 Although 
interpretive rules cannot go beyond the text of a statute, this does 
not "imply that an interpretive statement may only paraphrase statu-
tory or regulatory language .... Accordingly, an interpretive state-
ment may 'suppl[y] crisper and more detailed lines than the authority 
being interpreted' without losing its exemption from notice and com-
ment requirements under [the APA]."38 Courts have thus noted that 
"the mere fact that a rule may have a substantial impact 'does not 
transform it into a legislative rule."'39 
35 See id. at 1045; see also United Tech. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
("If the rule is based on specific statutory provisions, and its validity stands or falls on the 
correctness of the agency's interpretation of those provisions, it is an interpretative rule."). See 
generally Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Constitutes "Interpretative Rule" Of Agency 
So As 7b Exempt Such Action From Notice Requirements Of Administrative Procedure Act, 
126 A.L.R. FED. 347 (1990). It should be noted, however, that a rule that interprets statutory 
or regulatory language having specific meaning may, in some cases, be promulgated either as a 
legislative or interpretive rule. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Anthony, supra note 5. But see Paralyzed Veterans of 
America v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (indicating that some "interpretive 
rules" must be issued as a legislative rule, "[iJf the statute ... to be interpreted is itself very 
general, using terms like 'equitable' or 'fair,' and the 'interpretation' really provides all the 
guidance .... "). 
36 See American Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1045; General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 
1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
37 Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also 
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 745 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Interpretive rules ... do not create [new 1 
rights .... "). 
38 Orengo Caraballo, 11 F.3d at 195. Recent D.C. Circuit Court decisions, however, have 
indicated, albeit in dicta, that alterations to, or departures from, existing interpretations of an 
agency's own substantive rules may require notice and comment. See infra notes 74 & 75 and 
accompanying text; see also Paralyzed Veterans of America, 117 F.3d at 586 (stating that an 
agency may not make a "fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation 
without notice and comment .... "). 
39 American Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1047 (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. United 
States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
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D. The Practical Binding Effect of Interpretive Rules 
Despite being, by definition, neither binding upon the courts nor 
the public, it is incorrect to assume that interpretive rules do not 
impose, as a practical manner, mandatory standards or obligations.40 
This is because an interpretive rule 
will have practical binding effect before it is actually applied if the 
affected private parties are reasonably led to believe that failure 
to conform will bring adverse consequences, such as an enforce-
ment action or denial of an application. If the document is couched 
in mandatory language, or in terms indicating that it will be 
regularly applied, a binding intent is strongly evidenced. In some 
circumstances, if the language of the [rule] is such that private 
parties can rely on it as a norm or safe harbor by which to shape 
their actions, it can be binding as a practical matter.41 
Thus, if an administrative agency treats an interpretive rule in the 
same manner it treats a legislative rule, i.e., as dispositive of the 
issues it addresses, the document will be binding.42 Where the agency 
uses mandatory or rigid language in an interpretive rule, private 
parties will likely consider themselves bound to follow the rule in the 
belief that they will suffer by noncompliance.43 In many instances in 
the area of environmental regulation, industry may prefer to consider 
an interpretive rule binding because it delineates the limits of accept-
40 See Anthony, su'JYf'a note 5, at 1332-55 (listing examples of agency use of non-legislative 
rules to bind the public). 
41 [d. at 1328-29 (citations omitted); see also Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 
943,947 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("mandatory, definitive language is a powerful, even potentially disposi-
tive factor" suggesting that the interpretive rules were "presently binding norm[s]"). 
42 See Paralyzed Veterans of America, 117 F.3d at 588 ("The Department's interpretation of 
its regulation, of course, has real consequences. But that is always true when a Department or 
agency selects an interpretation of an ambiguous statute or rule, and often we acknowledge a 
government agency's right to do so as an 'interpretative' rule without notice and comment."); 
Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
43 See, e.g., Asimow, su'[yf'a note 19, at 383-84. 
[d. 
Although the theoretical difference between the legal effect of legislative and nonleg-
islative rules is clear, the practical line-drawing problem has proved difficult for a 
number of reasons. The most important reason for the haziness of the distinction is 
that the practical impact of either type of rule on the members of the public is the 
same. Most members of the public assume that all agency rules are valid, correct, and 
unalterable. Consequently, most people attempt to conform to them rather than to 
mount costly, time consuming, and usually futile challenges. Although legislative and 
nonlegislative rules are conceptually distinct and although their legal effect is pro-
foundly different, the real-world consequences are usually identical. 
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able behavior.44 By obeying the rule a company protects itself from 
civil or criminal penalties, and the expensive and time-consuming 
burden of a court challenge to an enforcement action. Companies that 
comply with an interpretive rule with practical binding effect there-
fore have an incentive to encourage compliance by other companies 
in the same industrial sector, e.g., their competitors. 
E. Policy Statements 
A general statement of policy cannot create a norm binding on 
either the promulgating agency45 or regulated parties.46 Although 
statements of policy and interpretive rules serve different functions, 
a policy statement is generally considered a weaker instrument be-
cause it cannot even bind the agency.47 A statement merely provides 
the agency with the internal guidance necessary to undertake discre-
tionary duties. In fact, if a policy statement is determined by a court 
to be inflexible, it may be struck down as an attempt by the agency 
to subversively create a legislative rule.48 
An agency "that treats . . . a [policy] statement as binding and 
conclusive is effectively failing to offer an adequate explanation for 
the ensuing action."49 The policy statement exemption in the APA was 
designed to "allow agencies to announce their 'tentative intentions for 
44 Cf DAVIS supra note 20 ("To the extent that an agency possesses significant discretionary 
power over a class of regulatees or beneficiaries, many are likely to 'comply' 'voluntarily' with 
an agency's 'nonbinding' statement of its preferred policies."). See generally Kenneth K. Kilbert 
& Christian J. Helbling, Interpreting Regulations In Environmental Enforcement Cases: 
Where Agency Deference And Fair Notice Collide, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (1998) (discussing 
judicial deference to agency interpretations in environmental enforcement cases and importance 
of "fair notice"). 
45 See Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
46 See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
47 See Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("An agency policy 
statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or interpret a legal norm .... We thus have said 
that policy statements are binding on neither the public, nor the agency. The primary distinction 
between a substantive rule-really any rule-and a general statement of policy, then, turns on 
whether an agency intends to bind itself to a particular legal position."); see also United States 
Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
48 See McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (to be 
exempt from legislative rulemaking requirements a policy statement must be tentative and not 
intended to be binding); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). In comparison, an agency may be bound by many of its existing interpretive rules, with 
the D.C. Circuit now requiring notice and comment procedures for changes to an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
49 Panhandle Producers and Royalty Owners Assoc. v. Economic Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 
1105, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
530 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:519 
the future' ... without binding themselves."50 Courts will not void a 
policy statement where it has "some substantive impact, so long as it 
'leave[s] the administrator free to exercise ..• informed discretion."'51 
A policy statement, therefore, is merely a flexible framework for the 
prospective implementation or fulfillment of a discretionary duty. 52 In 
short, a policy statement is "an agency statement of substantive law 
or policy, of general or particular applicability and future effect, that 
was not issued legislatively and is not an interpretive rule."5B 
Policy statements are relatively easy to issue because an agency is 
not required to abide by the notice and comment requirements of the 
APA,54 but "[t]he price to the agency is that the policy 'is subject to 
complete attack before it is finally applied in future cases."'55 An 
"agency relying on a previously adopted policy statement rather than 
a rule must be ready to justify the policy 'just as if the policy state-
ment had never been issued."'56 Thus, if a petitioner attacks the rea-
soning of a policy statement and the agency responds "merely by 
saying, in effect, 'That is no longer open to discussion. We resolved it 
in the Policy Statement,' then the agency's conduct would belie its 
characterization of the Policy Statement."57 However, "[ w ]hen a party 
attacks a policy on grounds that the agency already has dispatched in 
prior proceedings, the agency can simply refer to those proceedings 
if their reasoning remains applicable and adequately refutes the chal-
lenge. But the agency must always stand ready 'to hear new argu-
ment' and to 'reexamine the basic propositions' undergirding the pol-
50 American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowes, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974»; see Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94 ("By issuing a 
policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know its current enforcement or adjudicatory 
approach. The agency retains the discretion and the authority to change its position-even 
abruptly-in any specific case because a change in its policy does not affect the legal norm."). 
51 Panhandle Producers, 822 F.2d at 1110 (quoting Guardian Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. 
Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1980». 
52 Policy statements must be "designed to inform rather than to control." American Trucking 
Ass'ns, Inc. v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 462 (5th Cir. 1981). 
53 Anthony, supra note 5, at 1325. 
54 The APA requires that each agency publish, in the Federal Register, all "substantive rules 
of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or 
interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency . . .. " See 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(I)(D) (1994)(emphasis added); see generally Asimow, supra note 14, at n.31. 
Because of this broad requirement, publication in the Federal Register alone provides no insight 
into the nature or type of rule being published. 
65 Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at 39). 
56 [d. at 877 (quoting Bethel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1992». 
57 Panhandle Producers and Royalty Owners v. Economic Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 1105, 
1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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icy."58 The non-binding, and prospective, character of a policy state-
ment generally makes it unripe for review until actually applied to a 
factual situation.59 
II. PUTTING THE PIECES ToGETHER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE D.C. 
CIRCUIT'S ApPROACH TO THE REVIEW OF INTERPRETIVE RULES 
In the past, the D.C. Circuit has rarely hesitated to review EPAin-
terpretive rules under the jurisdictional authority granted by RCRA 
section 7006(a)(1).60 The D.C. Circuit has also reviewed interpretive 
rules promulgated by EPA under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act61 (CERCLA) and the 
Clean Air Act62 (CAA), both of which contain jurisdictional provisions 
similar to section 7006(a)(1).63 The D.C. Circuit, however, has never 
explicitly stated that it has jurisdiction under RCRA section 
7006(a)(1), or the equivalent provisions in these other statutes, to 
review interpretive rules. This is a significant omission, but perhaps 
not surprising considering the perpetual state of confusion and flux of 
administrative law decisions in the D.C. Circuit.64 
58 Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 878 (citing McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1321 
(D.C. Cir. 1988». 
59 See United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that because 
a general statement of policy cannot be binding, courts prefer to review a statement after it is 
applied); Industrial Safety Equip. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
("Discretionary agency positions are generally best not tested on review until the policy is 
actually applied to a specific factual situation."); Office of Communication of United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 105--06 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at 49 (noting that 
general statements of policy are not subject to judicial review if there is no immediate and 
significant impact). See generally infra Section lILA. 
60 See generally, Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reviewing EPA's 
interpretation of the LDR storage provision under RCRA § 7006(a)(1»; Chemical Waste Man-
agement, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reviewing RCRA interpretive rules 
without raising any concerns regarding jurisdiction under § 7006(a)(1». But cf infra note 71. 
61 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). The judicial review provision of CERCLA, found at section 
9613(a), states in relevant part that "[r ]eview of any regulation promulgated under this chapter 
may be had upon application by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the United States for the District of Columbia. Any such application shall be made within ninety 
days from the date of promulgation of such regulations .... " See id. § 9613. 
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(b)(1) (1994). 
63 See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reviewing an interpretive 
rule under CERCLA section 9613 (a»; General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (reviewing an interpretive rule promulgated under the CAA). However, not all 
environmental statutes contain a comparable judicial review provision. See, e.g., Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994). 
64 See generally supra note 18. 
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A. American Portland Cement, Montrose Chemical, and Florida 
Power & Electric: The Beginning of a Shift or More "Smog"? 
The D.C. Circuit's analysis in American Portland Cement Alliance 
v. EPA65 and Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. EPA,66 raises 
the possibility that the D.C. Circuit may be in the process of substan-
tially narrowing the limits of its jurisdiction under RCRA section 
7006(a)(1) and like provisions. In Portland Cement the court held that 
section 7006(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction to review petitions filed 
by trade associations challenging EPA's "Regulatory Determination 
on Cement Kiln Dust."67 The court found that it lacked jurisdiction 
''because EPA's Regulatory Determination [did] not constitute one of 
the three actions designated as reviewable under RCRA [section] 
7006(a)(1), but instead [was] simply a determination to undertake 
rulemaking in [the] future."6s The court concluded that "[b]y its plain 
terms, RCRA [section] 7006(a)(1) provides for review by the D.C. 
Circuit of only three types of EPA actions: the promulgation of final 
regulations, the promulgation of requirements, and the denial of pe-
titions for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of RCRA regula-
tions."69 
In stating the jurisdictional limitations of section 7006(a)(1), the 
court in Portland Cement noted that just because it "ha[d] taken 
jurisdiction in the past does not affect [future] analysis because juris-
dictional issues that were assumed but never expressly decided in 
prior opinions do not thereby become precedents."7o Because there is 
no explicit precedent stating that section 7006(a)(1) and equivalent 
provisions in other statutes provide the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction to 
review interpretive rules, the possibility exists that the D.C. Circuit 
may eventually conclude that these judicial review provisions do not 
provide the circuit with final or exclusive jurisdiction over interpre-
tive rules.71 Furthermore, this statement from Portland Cement dem-
65 101 F.3d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
66 132 F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
67 See Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 773-74. 
68 [d. at 773. 
69 [d. at 775. 
70 [d. at 776. 
71 The Portland Cement court, in its discussion of its jurisdiction to review agency actions 
under RCRA § 7006(a), neglected to specifically list interpretive rules. See id. at 774-75. Com-
bined with the court's strict view on the limits of its jurisdiction, see id. at 775 (''it is axiomatic 
in our federal jurisprudence that inferior courts, including ... this Court, have only that 
jurisdiction afforded to them by Congress") (citation omitted), this indicates that the D.C. 
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onstrates that the D.C. Circuit would not feel bound to accept juris-
diction under such provisions to review interpretive rules merely 
because it may have undertaken review in the past. 
The court in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. EPA addressed whether 
two internal EPA memoranda constituted regulations reviewable un-
der CERCLA section 9613(a),72 a provision equivalent to RCRA sec-
tion 7006(a)(1).73 Citing Portland Cement, the court articulated three 
factors relevant to determining whether an agency action may be 
subject to review: 
(1) the agency's own characterization of the action; (2) whether 
the agency published such actions in the Federal Register or Code 
of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether the action had binding 
effects on either private parties or the agency.74 
In an attempt to preclude judicial review, EPA contended that the 
challenged memoranda did not amount to "regulations" within the 
meaning of CERCLA section 9613(a)-while Montrose did not dis-
pute that the court would be without jurisdiction if it were to find that 
the memoranda were not regulations.75 The court determined that the 
memoranda were not valid "regulations" as defined in the statute 
because they did not satisfy the three-part test, and therefore the 
court lacked jurisdiction to review the documents.76 This three part 
test is not entirely new and has been used in similar forms by the D.C. 
Circuit in the past, but it has never been as succinctly stated and 
applied.77 
Similar to the court in Montrose Chemical, the court in Portland 
Cement was particularly concerned with the nonbinding charac-
teristics of the EPA determination being challenged, stating that 
"[a]n announcement of an agency's intent to establish law and policy 
Circuit has begun to take a harder look at its jurisdiction to review cases brought under 
provisions such as RCRA § 7006(a). 
72 See Montrose Chern. Corp. v. EPA, 132 F.3d 90, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
73 42 U .S.C. § 9613(a). 
74 Montrose Chemical, 132 F.3d at 94 (citing Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 776). 
76 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 776; see also McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 
F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing how reviewability of agency action is affected by the 
binding effect of the pronouncement); Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 
800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing the impact of an agency's characterization of an 
administrative action); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(stating the dividing point between regulations and general statements of policy is publication 
in the Code of Federal Regulations). 
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in the future is not the equivalent of actual promulgation of a final 
regulation."78 EPA did not contend that the determination was a final 
agency action-in fact the determination itself only stated that the 
agency planned to undertake rulemaking in the future.79 The court's 
rationale appears to be grounded in a reluctance to review a determi-
nation that was not binding on EPA or on industry.so 
Whether Portland Cement and Montrose Chemical signal a shift 
in the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of these judicial review provisions, 
or merely a slight adjustment, remains to be seen. It is uncertain to 
what extent these cases may affect the D.C. Circuit's future consid-
eration of interpretive rules. Neither in Portland Cement nor Mon-
trose Chemical did the D.C. Circuit make an explicit indication that 
interpretive rules are unreviewable under RCRA section 7006(a)(1) 
or comparable provisions. Nor did Portland Cement explicitly over-
rule or vacate any earlier cases which had demonstrated the Circuit's 
willingness to review interpretive rules under judicial provisions. 
Recently, in Florida Power & Light v. EPA, however, the D.C. Circuit 
again revisited these issues.81 In coming to its decision, the court 
examined explanations for the review of policy statements and inter-
pretive rules undertaken in several previous D.C. Circuit decisions.8\! 
The circuit failed to identify one instance where a judicial review 
provision provided the basis for review of an interpretive rule prior 
to its application. For instance, the circuit explained that the decision 
to review a policy statement in Edison Electric Institute v. EPA83 
"hinged on a determination that the challenged statement effectively 
reopened a prior regulation and, thus, the challenge was really to the 
substance of the prior regulation."84 
In Florida Power & Light, the petitioner sought review of preamble 
statements in a 1994 proposed rule under RCRA's judicial review 
78 101 F.3d at 777. 
79 See id. ("EPA's stated intent is to defer law and policymaking ... until the formulation of 
tailored standards."). 
80 See id. (''Where, as here, a proposed regulation is still in 'flux,' review is 'premature,' and 
the court has no jurisdiction under the APA.") (quoting Action on Smoking & Health v. Depart-
ment of Labor, 28 F.3d 162, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1994». 
81 145 F.3d 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
82 See id. at 1419-20. 
83 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Whether petitioners in Edison Electric were challenging an 
interpretive rule or a policy statement is not entirely clear-the challenge concerned "EPA's 
interpretation of the storage provision, as articulated in its Enforcement Policy Statement." [d. 
at 331. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that EPA argued in Edison Electric that the court 
was "without jurisdiction to consider the petition for review because it was not timely filed 
[under section 7006(a)(1) of RCRA)." [d. 
84 Florida Power & Light, 145 F.3d at 1420. 
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provision.85 In addressing whether jurisdiction was appropriate under 
RCRA section 7006, the court based its analysis on the three elements 
identified in Portland Cement.86 The court determined that the chal-
lenged statements, although published in the Federal Register,87 were 
not characterized as a final rule by the agency and that EPA had not 
applied the challenged statements as binding. 88 Th~ court concluded 
that "[u]nless and until [the agency] invokes the preamble in an 
attempt to affect the outcome of a real dispute, there is little need for 
and no factual basis to inform our inquiry into its validity."89 Ulti-
mately, the court dodged making a final determination on whether the 
preamble statements at issue were interpretive rules, noting that 
even if they were, the claims of the petitioner failed the test of 
ripeness and were therefore unreviewable.90 
The D.C. Circuit, in Florida Power & Light, appears to have at least 
entertained the possibility that it had authority under judicial review 
provisions such as RCRA section 7006(a)(1) to review interpretive 
rules. Specifically, the court applied the factors identified in Portland 
Cement to the challenged agency action, a preamble statement. As 
noted, however, the circuit chose to sidestep the issue of whether the 
preamble statement was an interpretive rule, and whether an inter-
pretive rule would satisfy the Portland Cement analysis. Ultimately, 
the court chose to decline review based on its ripeness analysis,91 once 
again leaving unanswered the question of whether, under these judi-
85 See id. at 1416. 
85 See id. at 1418; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
87 The court indicated that publication in the Code of Federal Regulations, rather than merely 
in the Federal Register, is the more important consideration. See Florida Power & Light, 145 
F.3d at 1418; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
88 Although the petitioner claimed that the preamble statements were "final interpretive 
rules," the court appeared skeptical at best. See id. at 1419 ("Significantly, however, Florida 
P&L does not claim that the preamble statements themselves had a binding effect on the 
company."). 
89 [d. at 1420 (quoting Kennecott Utah Copper v. DOl, 88 F.3d 1191, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1996». 
Kennecott does not state that there is a categorical bar to judicial review of a preamble, stating 
instead that the "question of reviewability hinges upon whether the preamble has independent 
legal effect, which in turn is a function of the agency's intention to bind either itself or regulated 
parties." Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1223. In fact, Kennecott indicates that if a preamble represented 
"an interpretation of an identified statutory provision, [or 1 a clarification of an otherwise binding 
regulation," that it would likely be reviewable. See id. 
90 See Florida Power & Light, 145 F.3d at 1421-22 ("Even assuming that Florida P&L were 
challenging a final interpretive rule, it is clear that its claims are not ripe for review."); see also 
infra Section lILA. regarding Ripeness Considerations. 
91 See Florida Power & Light, 145 F.3d at 1421 ("Florida P&IJs claims are not ripe for review 
at this time."). 
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cial review provisions, interpretive rules are subject to pre-enforce-
ment or pre-application review in the circuit. 
B. Application of the Portland Cement Factors to Interpretive 
Rules 
It is possible to analyze how the D.C. Circuit may approach this 
issue in future cases, however, by applying to interpretive rules the 
Portland Cement/Montrose Chemical three part test for determining 
whether an agency action is a "regulation" within the jurisdiction of 
RCRA section 7006(a)(1) and similar provisions. This analysis high-
lights the confusion in this area of administrative law. 
The first prong of the test requires that the court inquire into the 
agency's characterization of the action.92 For the sake of argument, 
suppose the agency calls its action "an issuance of an interpretive rule 
of general applicability"-and that the agency's characterization is not 
challenged. Because the D.C. Circuit has not explicitly determined 
whether an interpretive rule is reviewable under judicial review pro-
visions in some environmental statutes, the agency's characterization, 
at least at the first stage of the test, has little value. 
The second prong of the test considers whether the rule has been 
published in the Federal Register.93 In issuing an interpretive rule of 
general applicability, however, an agency is required by the APA to 
publish the rule in the Federal Register.94 The D.C. Circuit has not 
specifically articulated its reasoning for adopting this second prong.95 
But for the purposes of analysis here, the basis for this prong is nearly 
irrelevant-an interpretive rule of general applicability will always, 
by necessity, meet the requirement.96 
92 See Montrose Chern. Corp. v. EPA, 132 F.3d 90, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1998); American Portland 
Cement Alliance v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
93 See Montrose Chemical, 132 F.3d at 95; American Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 776. 
M See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1994). 
95 For instance, the D.C. Circuit may have adopted the second prong in an effort to allow 
review of only legislative rules under section 7006(a)(1)--overlooking the publication require-
ment for interpretive rules of general applicability. Cf supra note 54. An alternative, equally 
plausible basis for the requirement is that the D.C. Circuit wanted to limit its jurisdiction to 
those agency actions which had been amply announced to the public through pUblication. 
96 Recently, in Florida Power & Light, the D.C. Circuit appeared to indicate that the more 
important consideration is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), rather than 
mere publication in the Federal Register. See 145 F.3d at 1418. If the D.C. Circuit narrows this 
test by eliminating publication in the Federal Register as a consideration, instead requiring 
publication in the CFR, the vast majority of interpretive rules would certainly not be reviewable 
under a judicial review provision. 
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With the first prong essentially meaningless97 and the second prong 
met, the third prong is determinative. This prong requires that the 
court determine whether the action had a binding effect on either 
private parties or the agency.98 Legislative rules clearly meet this 
requirement.99 Policy statements, just as clearly, fail to meet this 
requirement. lOo Interpretive rules cannot be legally binding on private 
parties.101 But, as has been noted, interpretive rules can have a bind-
ing practical effect on private parties.102 
The extent to which an agency, however, is bound by its own inter-
pretive rules of general applicability, as compared to the extent to 
which it is bound by its legislative rules, is not entirely settled. An 
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute may be changed sig-
nificantly without notice and comment, so long as the new interpre-
tation is a reasonable one and the revised interpretive rule of gen-
eral applicability is published in the Federal Register.103 While an 
interpretive rule of this type may be "binding" on the agency, the 
administrative hurdles necessary to make a change are minimal as 
compared to a legislative rule and can be accomplished with no pre-
publication fanfare or notification and with, essentially, immediate ef-
fect.104 Yet if an agency wishes to change an interpretation of its own 
legislative rule, rather than of a statute, the D.C. Circuit has indicated 
that notice and comment may be necessary-thereby setting a 
greater barrier to change. lOS In this case the agency is "bound" by its 
interpretation of its legislative rule in the same manner the agency is 
bound by the legislative rule: a re-interpretation would require both 
notice and comment and publication in the Federal Register-essen-
tially the promulgation of a new legislative rule.106 
97 Cf Montrose Chemical, 132 F.3d at 94 (stating that "although EPA maintains that its 
memorandum did not constitute a regulation subject to review, that is an issue for [the court] 
to decide," thereby giving little credence to the agency's own characterization). 
98 See Montrose Chemical, 132 F.3d at 95; American Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 776. 
99 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. But see infra Section III.A. (noting that a 
legislative rule may, in rare circumstances, be unripe for review--even if the D.C. Circuit 
possesses jurisdiction for review under RCRA section 7006(a)(1». 
100 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The fact that policy statements do not meet 
the requirement could easily confuse this analysis because of the unfortunate and incorrect 
"tendency of the courts and litigants to lump interpretive rules and policy statements together 
.... " Syncor Int'l v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
101 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
102 See generally supra Section I.D. (discussing the practical binding effect of interpretive 
rules). 
103 See Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94. 
Th be sure, since an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to 
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Applying the Portland Cement three part jurisdictional test for 
judicial review to interpretive rules leads to confounding and incon-
clusive results depending upon whether the agency's interpretive rule 
involves a statute or legislative rule. An interpretation,to7 or re-inter-
pretation, of an agency's own legislative rule apparently satisfies the 
test and could be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit. lOB This is because such 
an action has "final" characteristics, changeable in the future only 
through notice and comment, and therefore is essentially binding on 
the agency. 
judicial deference under Chevron, it might be thought that the interpretive rule-par-
ticularly if it changes a prior statutory interpretation as an agency may do without 
notice and comment-is, in reality a change in the legal norm. Still, in such a situation 
the agency does not claim to be exercising authority to itself make p.ositive law. Instead 
it is construing the product of congressional lawmaking ''based on specific statutory 
provisions." 
Id. (citations omitted); cf Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 863-64 (1984). In Chevron, the Court stated that 
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of [a] term 
... does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference should be 
accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpretation is 
not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed 
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a 
continuing basis. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64. 
104 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
!O5 See Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94-95 ("Otherwise, the agency could evade its notice and comment 
obligation by 'modifying' a substantive rule that was promulgated by notice and comment 
rulemaking."); see also Paralyzed Veterans of America v. District Columbia Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 
586 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Yet, in the confusing and constantly evolving area of administrative law, it 
is not clear how strictly the D.C. Circuit will enforce this relatively new distinction between 
interpretations of statutes and legislative rules. The D.C. Circuit's discussion to date on this 
issue has been largely dicta rather than binding precedent. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 408 
(4th ed. 1979) (defining dicta as "[e]xpressions in court's opinion which go beyond the facts before 
the court and therefore are individual views of author of opinion and not binding in subsequent 
cases."). For instance, although Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala discussed the distinctions between 
an agency's interpretation of a regulation and the interpretation of a statute, the court ulti-
mately concluded that the rule at issue was not an interpretive rule. 127 F.3d 90, 95 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). In fact, the Sync.or court even explicitly noted that its discussion concerning an agency's 
interpretation of its own substantive regulation was not at issue. See id. at 94 ("We should note, 
in order to be complete (although this variation is not implicated in the case before us), that 
an interpretative rule can construe an agency's substantive regulation as well as a statute .... ") 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
106 See Syncor, 127 F.3d at 95; 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1994). 
107 Consider, for instance, cases where the agency simultaneously publishes a legislative rule 
and an interpretation of general applicability of an aspect of that rule. In the past the D.C. 
Circuit, however, has ignored the issue and implicitly treated the conglomerate as one legislative 
rule. 
!O8 Assuming strict adherence to the distinction discussed supra note 105. 
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An agency's interpretation, or re-interpretation, of a statute does 
not so clearly satisfy the Portland Cement test. It is difficult, under 
existing precedent, to argue that such interpretations are "final" or 
''binding,'' given that the agency can issue a reinterpretation without 
notice and comment. Therefore such rules do not appear to be review-
able pursuant to RCRA section 7006 or similar provisions, under the 
current D.C. Circuit approach. 
III. RIPENESS & PRECLUSIVE NESS CONSIDERATIONS 
Beyond the jurisdictional barriers to the review of interpretive 
rules potentially presented by RCRA section 7006 and similar provi-
sions there remain two further potential issues: (1) the threshold issue 
of ripeness; and (2) the implications of the D.C. Circuit's pre-applica-
tion review of interpretive rules on issues of preclusiveness. 
A. Ripeness Considerations 
Even if the D.C. Circuit were to determine that it had jurisdic-
tion under RCRA section 7006(a)(1) and similar provisions to review 
interpretive rules, ripeness might still prove a bar to litigation.109 
Ripeness is a threshold doctrine by which courts test the fitness of 
controversies for judicial resolution yo Thus the D.C. Circuit might be 
obligated to dismiss a challenge to an interpretive rule if the rule is 
not ripe for review. 
In assessing whether a case is ripe, a court must generally consider 
"[1] the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and [2] the hardship 
to the parties of withholding court consideration."1l1 The D.C. Circuit 
has held, in considering the fitness prong, that it is "dispositive that 
Congress has affirmatively expressed a preference for prompt review 
of RCRA regulations by establishing a ninety-day window for filing 
challenges," thus creating an assumption of reviewability of regula-
tions promulgated under RCRA and other statutes with similar pro-
109 See, e.g., Florida Power & Light v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that 
in cases discussing review of preamble statements "the issues of reviewability and ripeness 
converge") (citations omitted). 
110 See Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
111 Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (quoted in Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 
F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
112 Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 333; see Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 
1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("pre-enforcement review of agency rules and regulations has become the 
norm, not the exception, a trend accelerated by Congress' enactment of a host of regulatory 
statutes specifically providing for this. The review provision of the Clean Air Act ... is typical.") 
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visions.1l2 If the D.C. Circuit finds that interpretive rules fall within 
the scope of a judicial review provision, like RCRA section 7006, such 
rules would therefore be subject to the presumption of ripeness.1l3 
Despite the presumption, however, it is possible that "a challenge 
filed within the statutory period might not be considered 'fit for 
judicial decision' when there are clear and significant institutional 
benefits to be derived from postponing review."1l4 In cases arising 
under RCRA section 7006, and similar provisions, once an issue is 
determined to be clearly fit for review, however, there "is no need to 
consider the hardship to the parties of withholding court considera-
tion"1l5 because of the presumption for reviewability as evidenced by 
the statute. Thus the second prong of the traditional ripeness test 
need not be considered in this context. 
In Edison Electric, the D.C. Circuit outlined a four stage analysis 
for determining whether a regulation is fit for review and therefore 
ripe. The first consideration is whether the review presents a "purely 
legal question."llS The second issue is whether the agency position 
"represents its final word on the subject, i.e. its policy has crystal-
lized."l17 Third, the court must consider whether its deliberations are 
unlikely to be aided by application of the interpretation or regulation 
to a particular set of facts.llS Finally, a court contemplates whether 
the case can be characterized as one in which "resolution of the 
dispute is likely to prove unnecessary if the court elects to defer 
review."l19 The inquiry does not require that a rule necessarily be 
applied prior to judicial review, in fact "[i]t is clear beyond peradven-
ture that the validity of a rule can be ripe for review whether or not 
(citations and quotations omitted). See generally Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 
F.2d 1035, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
113 See Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 333; Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1204; 
Mountain States fil. & Tel. Co., 939 F.2d at 1040-41. 
114 Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 333. 
115 Action for Children's Tel. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that when an 
issue is determined to be fit for judicial review, thereby meeting the first element of the ripeness 
test, and Congress has emphatically declared a preference for immediate review, it is not 
necessary to consider the ''hardship to the parties" element of the ripeness test). But see Clean 
Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1205 (considering, without comment to the aforemen-
tioned cases, hardship to the parties in a case filed pursuant to the CAA judicial review 
provision). 
116 See Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 333. 
117 Id. 
118 See id. at 333-34. 
119 I d. at 334. 
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it has actually been improperly applied and enforced in a concrete 
factual setting."12o 
Despite the presumption that "purely legal" questions are fit for 
judicial review, such review may still be inappropriate when the chal-
lenged policy is "not sufficiently fleshed out to allow the court to see 
the concrete effects and implications of its decision or when deferring 
consideration might eliminate the need for review altogether."121 Find-
ing that a controversy lacks ripeness due to an insufficiently "fleshed 
out" policy only occurs when the agency action is either tentative or 
unfinished.122 An interpretive rule of general applicability, however, is 
generally considered the final agency statement of a statutory or 
regulatory definition or requirement.123 Thus, in effect, an interpretive 
rule is the final "crystallization" of agency policy, and an agency is 
subsequently bound, although possibly to varying extents, by its pro-
nouncement.124 An interpretive rule of general applicability, by its 
nature, will also present a purely legal question.125 Thus the first and 
second prongs of the fitness test are satisfied by an interpretive rule. 
The third prong is also easily satisfied. Because the nature of an 
interpretive rule is such that it will present a purely legal question, 
the D.C. Circuit is unlikely to find that a rule's application to specific 
facts is necessary in order to make a determination of whether the 
rule is a valid interpretation of an underlying statute or legislative 
rule. 
In considering the final aspect of the test, it is unlikely that resolu-
tion of a dispute over an interpretive rule will "prove unnecessary" if 
the court chooses to defer review. First, as previously noted, the D.C. 
120 General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d 979, 990 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also 
Federal Communications Comm'n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 585-86 (1981) (re-
viewing the validity of a policy statement not yet applied to any particular set of facts); 
Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 672 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(UN or do we consider review excluded for lack of a final agency decision or simply because the 
order in question is 'interpretive."'); Independent Banker Assoc. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 926 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that interpretive rules represent the definitive position of the issuing 
agency and thus raise a uclearcut legal issue susceptible of judicial resolution"). 
121 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 57 F.3d 1099, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
122 See id. 
123 See generally supra note 17 (definition of interpretive rule). 
124 See supra Section I.C. But consider the different procedural requirements that the D.C. 
Circuit has indicated may be necessary for an agency to change an interpretation of a statute 
as compared to an interpretation of a regulation. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
125 See generally supra note 12 (definition of interpretive rule); see also supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. 
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Circuit has stated that judicial review provisions, like RCRA section 
7006(a)(1), indicate Congress' preference for prompt review of agency 
actions promulgated under the particular statutory authority. Thus, 
if the circuit determines that it has jurisdiction, there will be a pre-
sumption that the interpretive rule is ripe. On the other hand, prom-
ulgating an interpretive rule does not technically change the legal 
rights of regulated parties;126 rather, an agency is merely putting those 
parties on notice of its interpretation of a statute or regulation-an 
interpretation the agency plans to use in bringing future enforcement 
proceedings or in conducting its business.127 Thus, because legal rights 
have not been altered by an interpretive rule,128 an argument can be 
advanced that the underlying issues are no more ripe for review 
under RCRA section 7006(a)(1) after the pUblication of the rule, then 
they were before publication. But the practicality of such an argument 
is questionable. 
Deferring review will simply cause the issue to resurface when the 
agency relies on the interpretive rule in an enforcement proceeding. 
The D.C. Circuit has stated that judicial review should be available 
where "one is left with the overpowering sense that if the question is 
not adjudicated at this time, it will be in the not-too-distant future."129 
The fact that a group is prepared to bring a suit to challenge a rule 
demonstrates that there is concern and disagreement over the rule. 
In such an instance, it appears nearly certain that if the challenge is 
dismissed, it will quickly resurface after the rule's application.130 Thus, 
having addressed all four of the Edison Electric requirements, it 
appears that an interpretive rule would likely be found ripe for review 
in an action filed within the appropriate time period called for in a 
judicial review provision.131 
126 See, e.g., Syncor Int'l v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("An interpretative rule ... 
typically reflects an agency's construction of a statute that has been entrusted to the agency to 
administer. The legal norm is one that Congress has devised; the agency does not purport to 
modify that norm .... "). 
127 See id.; see also WEST, supra note 6, at 40 ("[I]nterpretive rules serve to advise potentially 
affected parties of how agencies will construe statutory language in future situations."). 
128 The assertion that legal rights or expectations are not modified by interpretive rules is 
essentially a "legal fiction." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (6th ed. 1990) (a legal fiction is 
an "[a]ssumption of fact made by court as basis for deciding a legal question."). See generally 
supra Section I.D. 
129 Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
130 Cf Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining review on 
ripeness grounds is likely to merely postpone review). 
131 Cf Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (considering a challenge to an 
interpretive rule under CERCLA section 9613(a) within the 90 day period with no discussion 
of ripeness concerns and no indication that the rule has been applied). 
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Even if challenges to the interpretive rule filed within the judicial 
review period, prior to enforcement or application by the agency, were 
held to be unripe, review would not entirely be foreclosed. The D.C. 
Circuit has held in cases "involving the confrontation between a statu-
tory bar and a claim not yet prudentially ripe that a 'time limitation 
on petitions for judicial review ... can run only against challenges 
ripe for review."'I32 In Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Interstate 
Commerce Commission the petitioner had filed a timely petition, as 
required by the statute, for review of an Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) interpretative rule.133 The court, however, found that 
the action was not yet ripe because the ICC's interpretation lacked 
any current impact and imposed no requirements on the petitioner 
and others similarly situated.134 In dismissing the case, the court 
stated that the petitioner and others similarly situated would not be 
barred, if and when a fact-based controversy arose from the chal-
lenged interpretative order.135 Because the ripeness inquiry is wholly 
separate from the jurisdictional inquiry, if the D.C. Circuit merely 
postpones finding an interpretive rule ripe for review, when review 
is finally conducted, it could still be done pursuant to jurisdictional 
provisions such as RCRA section 7006(a)(1).136 If the D.C. Circuit is 
going to review an interpretive rule of general applicability under 
such jurisdiction, however, it would better serve the public to find the 
rule ripe for review in the first instance. Otherwise, industry will be 
forced to conform to the interpretive rule in order to provide the 
factual basis necessary to have the standing and ripeness necessary 
to challenge the rule, or risk civil or criminal penalties by violating 
132 Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 672 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1982»; 
see also General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d 979, 983 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("And, in 
any event, the ... limitation period may not begin to run with respect to interpretative rules 
until a fact-based controversy is ripe for judicial review."). 
133 See 672 F.3d at 148. 
134 See id. at 149. 
135 See id. 
136 Cf Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
ld. 
If we were to defer review [where Congress has declared a preference concerning the 
timing of review 1 merely because we could find no significant harm to the petitioner 
from delay, we would achieve the perverse result of postponing review to the detriment 
of the agency and the court and in contravention of the express preferences of Con-
gress, in the name of a prudential doctrine that is intended to protect the institutional 
needs of courts and agencies. As we have repeatedly observed, the ripeness doctrine 
requires a pragmatic and commonsense application.) (footnote omitted). 
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the rule in an effort to create ripeness. Encouraging such behavior is 
economically inefficient and serves no worthy legal purpose. 
An alternative scenario might arise if no challenge to the promul-
gation of an interpretive rule is made during the time-frame im-
posed by the applicable review provision. Without a challenge within 
the limitations period, all future cases challenging the interpretive 
rule's promUlgation may be foreclosed. But if an interpretive rule was 
clearly unripe during the review period, a later case might still be 
possible. In Eagle Picher Industries, Inc. v. EPA, the court empha-
sized, however, that "petitioners who delay filing requests for review 
on their own assessment of when an issue is ripe for review, do so at 
the risk of finding their claims time-barred."l37 The court warned that 
''in general, we will refuse to hypothesize whether, in retrospect, a 
claim would have been deemed ripe for review had it been brought 
during the statutory period, in order to save an untimely claim."l3s 
There are only three limited exceptions to the court's general refusal 
to consider saving an untimely claim: (1) where changed circum-
stances give rise to a new cause of action beyond the statutory period; 
(2) where compelling case precedent makes it clear beyond a reason-
able doubt that the claim was not ripe during the statutory period; or 
(3) where clear evidence that a failure to consider a petitioner's claims 
would work a manifest injustice.l39 This final scenario again illustrates 
why it is important for the D.C. Circuit to settle the issue of its 
jurisdiction to review interpretive rules under judicial review provi-
sions. Currently, under Eagle Picher precedent, parties may choose 
to challenge a questionable interpretive rule prior to enforcement or 
application, within the appropriate statutory review period, rather 
than choosing to wait and thereby risk finding their claims time-
barred.l40 
137 [d. at 909. 
138 [d. 
139 See id. In certain rare circumstances it may also be possible to obtain review under the 
"reopener" doctrine. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1073 
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
140 See 759 F.2d at 1919 ("We conclude that the petitioners were not justified in failing to seek 
judicial review during the statutory period. We recognize, however, that the relationship be-
tween the ripeness doctrine and the statutory review provisions that exhibit a strong congres-
sional preference for 'pre-enforcement' review was largely uncharted before this decision."). 
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B. Review in the D.C. Circuit May Not Preclude Further 
Challenge to an Interpretive Rule 
545 
If the D.C. Circuit accepts that it has jurisdiction under RCRA 
section 7006(a)(1) to review the promulgation of interpretive rules, 
the court is essentially stating its belief that such review precludes 
further review of the rule's promulgation by other circuits. Because 
of the inherent nature of interpretive rules, however, once reviewed 
and sustained by the D.C. Circuit under a statutory judicial review 
provision, the rule still cannot have the "force of law."l41 An interpre-
tive rule never has a "legal effect" but rather serves only as a pro-
nouncement to the public as to how the agency interprets the under-
lying statute or regulation. 142 The legal basis for any agency action or 
enforcement proceeding is the underlying statute or legislative rule, 
although the agency itself is guided by the interpretive rule.143 
A court "always has the power to substitute its judgment for that 
of the agency in the case of an interpretative rule .... Thus, in cases 
arising after the ... review period has expired, the court may under-
take and enforce its own interpretation of the statute without review-
ing the interpretative rule as such."144 If the D.C. Circuit reviews an 
interpretive rule under section 7006(a)(1), other circuits will be pre-
vented from hearing a challenge to a rule that is not grounded in the 
actual application of the specific rule to the petitioner.145 But when an 
141 See WEST, supra note 6, at 40-41 ("[Slome authorities believe that interpretive rules are 
more apt to be overturned by the courts on substantive grounds, since the judiciary retains the 
constitutional role as final interpreter of the law."); see also 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law 
§ 161 (1994) ("Interpretive rules are not intended to have any legal effect and do not have the 
force and effect of law. Accordingly, an interpretive rule is not binding on a court, which may 
disagree with an administrator's interpretation of a statute or regulation.") (citations omitted). 
142 See supra Section I.C. 
143 See General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d 979, 983 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Suffice 
it to say that a limitation on judicial review does not lend to an interpretative rule any binding 
force not already provided by the underlying statute."); American Mining Congress v. Mine 
Safety and Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Citizens to Save Spencer County 
v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
144 General Motors Corp., 724 F.2d at 983 n.30; see also Kelley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours 
and Co., 17 F.3d 836, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1994) (reviewing EPA interpretive rules in a case arising 
under CERCLA); Beazer East, Inc. v. EPA, 963 F.2d 603, 605 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1992) (showing a 
willingness to review EPA interpretive rules in the process of reviewing an internal agency 
memorandum); AcusA, supra note 12, at 65 ("Nonetheless, the agency cannot expect the 
interpretation to be binding in later proceedings; because it does not have the force of law, 
parties can challenge the interpretation."). 
145 The RCRA § 7006 judicial review provision provides exclusive jurisdiction to the D.C. 
Circuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a) (1996). Therefore, if the D.C. Circuit determines that it has 
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interpretive rule plays a role in future agency action or enforcement 
proceedings that end up in court, the court may essentially review the 
interpretive rule through its inherent authority to undertake a statu-
tory construction analysis. Thus, the court would determine whether 
the agency's interpretation is in agreement with the text and purpose 
of the actual statute or legislative rule. l46 For example, a district court 
presiding in an enforcement proceeding could hold that the rule is an 
invalid interpretation of the underlying statutory language and thus 
refuse to follow the interpretation stated in the rule. 
As stated, D.C. Circuit review of the interpretive rule under RCRA 
section 7006(a)(1) would preclude other circuits from reviewing the 
promulgation of an interpretive rule. l47 But other courts, as demon-
strated, have the ability to review the interpretive rule through their 
authority to engage in statutory construction. Thus, if a rule is relied 
upon in an enforcement action or other agency proceeding, another 
court could refuse to follow the rule, finding that the interpretation is 
in conflict with the underlying statute's language and purpose. Courts, 
however, give an agency's interpretation deference, and if a circuit 
were to sustain a rule, the principles of res judicata and stare decisis 
will prevent the rule from being continually challenged on identical 
grounds. l48 Courts, in reviewing an interpretive rule during an en-
forcement proceeding, or in the course of other litigation, must entitle 
the rule to substantial judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. l49 Agency interpretations of 
their own legislative rules are given an even greater degree of defer-
ence by the courts.l50 Furthermore, a decision by the D.C. Circuit that 
jurisdiction to review interpretive rules under § 7006, its jurisdiction is necessarily exclusive 
and thereby precludes any other court from exercising jurisdiction until the rule is applied in a 
specific instance by the Agency. 
146 See generally supra note 141. 
147 See generally supra note 141. 
148 The principle of res judicata holds "that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as 
to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, 
or cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979). The.doctrine of stare decisis 
holds that, "when a court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state 
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases, where facts are 
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and properties are the same."). See 
id. at 1261. 
149 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984); see, e.g., Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But 
see American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 561 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) ("A reviewing court may accord varying degrees of deference to an agency's interpretation 
of a statute."). 
1999] REVIEW OF INTERPRETIVE RULES 547 
an interpretive rule was valid would certainly be persuasive to other 
circuits examining the validity of a rule in an enforcement action. 
CONCLUSION 
The state of administrative law in the D.C. Circuit is in a constant 
state of flux and confusion. Administrative law is a complex field filled 
with delicate legal nuances. Yet with each successive D.C. Circuit 
opinion addressing administrative law, the legal terminology seems to 
become more confused and the "shroud of smog" grows thicker.151 The 
confusion does not arise solely from the judicial system; administra-
tive agencies also bear significant responsibility due to their often 
mystifying classification of their own actions. Often notices in the 
Federal Register are labeled inappropriately, with policy statements 
labeled interpretive rules, interpretive rules labeled guidance, and on 
and on. Statements made in preambles to substantive rules are often 
not clearly marked as interpretive rules, policy statements, or "sug-
gestions" or "guidance." In recognition of the different treatment 
afforded to different administrative actions, agencies may label seem-
ingly identical actions differently in litigation.152 Although outside the 
scope of this article, the specific issues addressed here, in addition to 
the entire field of administrative law, would be simplified if both the 
courts and the administrative agencies exercised restraint and discre-
tion in their use of administrative law terminology and made a con-
certed effort to establish enduring and clearly defined standards. 
Whether an interpretive rule of general applicability is subject to 
review pursuant to statutory provisions similar to RCRA section 
7006(a)(1) cannot be conclusively determined through application of 
the current test set forth by the D.C. Circuit in Portland Cement and 
Montrose Chemical. It is essential, however, that the D.C. Circuit 
decide this jurisdictional issue. In doing so, it will lift a layer of fog 
from the current state of administrative law, thereby giving both 
regulators and regulated parties notice of whether interpretive rules 
160 See Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993); United States v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 
47, 51 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Federal courts are bound by an agency's interpretation of its own 
legislative rule unless the interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative rule, violates the 
constitution or a federal statute, or is plainly erroneous."). 
161 See Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("tendency of courts and 
litigants to lump interpretative rules and policy statements together in contrast to substantive 
rules"); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also supra 
notes 18, 21 & 35. 
152 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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of general applicability are subject to review. This will allow all parties 
in administrative rulemakings to adjust their decisionmaking accord-
ingly and lead to more efficient use of the judicial system and greater 
clarity throughout the administrative rulemaking process. 
